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1. Introduction 
 
Charitable donations to UK charities working for overseas development have grown 
enormously over the last 30 years. From 1978 to 2004, total contributions to 
development charities among the top 200 fundraising charities increased almost 
seven-fold in real terms, and donations grew more quickly than to other charitable 
causes (Atkinson et al 2008). By the end of the period these larger charities focusing 
on overseas development and emergency relief received nearly £1 billion in donations 
and bequests, equal to about a quarter of the figure for the UK Government’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) at that time. 
What are the determinants of this trend? The existing empirical literature on 
the determinants of changes in charitable giving in the UK is small and provides only 
partial answers. The works by Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) [KPS henceforth] 
and Khanna and Sandler (2000) [KS] are closest to our own in that they use the same 
source of data as we do in this paper – information on the voluntary donated income 
of charities from the annual publication Charity Trends of the Charities Aid 
Foundation (CAF). The authors estimate models for the determinants of donations to 
four broad causes, including ‘overseas’. They concentrate on the impacts of charities’ 
fundraising expenditures and the grants that they receive from the government – 
seeking thereby to shed light on charities’ revenue strategies on the one hand and on 
the extent of crowding out of donations on the other. However, KPS and KS do not 
consider the impact of changes in the underlying macroeconomy on charitable 
donations (their data cover only 8 years), something that the onset of the current 
recession has generated considerable interest in (eg NCVO, 2009). Nor do they 
estimate the extent of any crowding out of overseas donations by the the UK 
government’s provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). By contrast, 
Banks and Tanner (1995), using another source (data pooled from 23 years of the 
Family Expenditure Survey), have estimated the income elasticity of charitable giving 
in the UK, but their data did not distinguish different causes. 
In this paper we extend the existing literature in several ways. First, our focus 
on giving for overseas development rather on a range of different causes allows us to 
give more consideration to the particular characteristics of giving to this cause –   
although we also model trends in giving to other causes to see if development really is 
different. In specifying an appropriate model we draw in part on new theory on giving   3
for development that has produced as part of the same project (Atkinson 2008). We 
look at the impact both of macroeconomic change as reflected in changing household 
incomes and at the ‘charity level’ variables that were the focus of KPS and KS. We 
also consider the UK government’s spending on ODA, which stagnated in the 1980s 
and most of the 1990s but has grown hugely since the late 1990s, and the impact of 
disasters – a key feature in giving to international charities – of which the Ethiopian 
famine of the early 1980s and the Asian Tsunami 20 years later are the most 
prominent examples. Like KPS and KS, we construct a panel of charities from the 
annual CAF reports although we use data from a substantially longer period, 27 years 
rather 8 years.
1 
  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature in more detail, including that 
mentioned above, and outlines our framework for modelling charitable giving for 
overseas development. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 explains our 
econometric specification. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Modelling charitable giving for development 
 
Models of giving 
 
We wish to explain the donations received by development charities and to compare 
their determinants with donations to charities serving other causes. In doing so, we 
need to recognise that a charity’s donations reflect both supply and demand: the 
impact of individuals’ behaviour in giving and the charity’s own efforts to collect 
money. This is underlined by the importance of what charity fundraisers call ‘the ask’: 
‘fund-raisers know that to get money donated, you have to ask for it’ (Andreoni 
2006). Unfortunately, as Andreoni goes on to emphasise ‘the interaction between 
supply and demand for philanthropy has been largely neglected in both theoretical and 
empirical analysis’. Our empirical model contains elements suggested from work on 
both sides of the market. 
  On the supply side, there is a rich body of theory on charitable giving, based 
on the assumption that individuals derive utility either from the benefit it brings the 
object of the charity (i.e. the ultimate recipient) or from the act of giving itself. These 
                                                 
1   A companion paper describes the construction of the panel and the trends in the data (Atkinson et 
al 2008).   4
are the public goods and ‘warm-glow’ motives. In general, models based on these 
approaches have not focused on any particular charitable cause. In this sense, giving 
has tended to be treated as a homogenous good. But in general people are not 
indifferent as to where their donation ends up – they think to give to a specific cause. 
In the case of overseas development, Atkinson (2008) argues that neither the public 
good model nor the warm-glow model succeed in capturing key aspects of the giving 
decision, including donor motivation and the ways that charities approach fundraising. 
He proposes a new ‘identification’ model that incorporates elements of both the 
existing approaches. 
  In Atkinson’s model, individuals giving money to a development charity 
‘identify’ with the ultimate recipients on a one-to-one or one-to-m basis, where m is a 
small number, e.g. the marginal poor family or village that the charity can extend help 
to with the individual’s donation. Their wellbeing enters the donor’s utility function, 
reflecting the notion that giving for development does arise from a concern for others 
and is not merely motivated by warm glow. But unlike in the pure public goods 
model, the donor’s utility is not assumed to be affected by the well-being of all 
persons receiving help from the charity. Hence the standard problem of that model – 
that individuals will free ride on the donations of others – does not arise. The 
‘identification’ model can therefore explain why people do contribute to large 
development charities. And it underlines why giving to different causes may be 
determined in different ways. 
  Donations are a function of donor income, reflecting in particular the warm 
glow approach, and, reflecting the public good approach, of leakages – the notion that 
not all of the amount given by the donor reaches the recipient. As Atkinson points out, 
the threat of leakage through corruption and misgovernment features prominently in 
debate about overseas aid.
2 Donor perceptions of need play a key role and these may 
be affected by both charity and government action. Government ODA affects need 
directly in the model: unlike other people’s donations, it is assumed to influence the 
living standards of the recipients with whom the donor identifies – providing a 
possible source of crowding out. In this case ODA reduces perceived need. But 
government action, including ODA flows, may also raise the perception of need by 
drawing attention to problems of developing countries. Atkinson’s model provides a 
                                                 
2   For example, see the qualitative research carried out as part of our ESRC-funded project that is 
reported in Atkinson and Eastwood (2007).   5
framework for interpreting charities’ actions: charities may increase the awareness of 
need through their fund-raising campaigns, but very high expenditure on fundraising 
may be seen by donors as excessive. It may therefore be seen as evidence of leakage 
.
3 
These two impacts of charity fundraising – one positive and one negative – 
have been analysed in the (smaller) literature that focuses on the demand side: the 
charities’ behaviour e.g. Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Weisbrod and Dominguez 
(1986). Several papers have estimated empirical models of donations received by 
charities. Three UK studies are particularly relevant to our research. Posnett and 
Sandler (1989), KPS and KS all use the same source as us, data from the CAF 
publication Charity Trends (and its forerunners), and consider the impact of both 
fundraising and government grants. The empirical specification in the three papers is 
quite similar as the authors look to identify the objective function of fundraisers, any 
crowding out by government grants to the charities, and the impact of charities’ 
alternative sources of income (e.g. bequests) which are also seen as potentially 
crowding out donations. In addition to estimating these effects for donations to all 
causes, all three papers estimate separate models for charities grouped under four 
headings of charitable cause: health, religion, social welfare, and overseas. In this they 
go against the run of the empirical literature on the supply side, which like the 
theoretical literature has tended not to distinguish the different charitable causes to 
which individuals give.
4 
Fundraising is allowed to have a direct impact on the donations received by a 
charity, hypothesized to be positive. But, following Rose-Ackerman (1982) and 
Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), fundraising is assumed also to affect the ‘price’ of 
donations, which is a measure of the cost to a donor of increasing the charitable 
output of a charity by £1. This is specified as (1 − t)/(1 − f − a) where t is marginal 
rate of tax faced by the individual and  f and a are the proportions of total expenditure 
spent by the charity on fundraising and administration respectively. Both fundraising 
and administration are seen here as leakages, increasing the price of giving and hence 
hypothesized to reduce giving. All three papers ignore t in practice. Prior to 2000, tax 
                                                 
3   Fundraising expenditure may also help to set m in the model, as in the case of ‘adopt a child’ 
programmes. 
4   Exceptions from the US include Feldstein (1975), Reece (1979), Schiff (1985), and Andreoni et al 
(1996). But as far as we are aware, the US studies have not separately identified giving for 
overseas development (other than Ribar and Wilhelm (1995), who look only at overseas giving).   6
deductions for charitable donations in the UK required giving through one’s employer 
via a payroll deduction or agreeing to covenant income to a charity for several years. 
Government grants to charities may crowd out their donations or may ‘crowd 
in’ more giving – they may be viewed by donors as a signal that a charity is worth 
supporting. In the case of the overseas development charities, these grants represented 
a total of about £250m in 2004-5, compared to donations of about £1bn (Atkinson et 
al 2008, charities among the top 200 in the CAF reports). Over the period we 
consider, they grew even more than donations – by a factor of 10 between the late 
1970s and the mid-1990s, when there was a levelling off. In general, these grants are 
to fund programme work in developing countries, and therefore they are included in 
the UK government’s ODA expenditure, although they constitute only a small part of 
the total (about 5 per cent in 2004). ODA is not included in the models for overseas 
donations in the KPS and KS papers, nor other variables motivated by consideration 
of the particular characteristics of any of the causes. (Much of the focus is on the 
modelling of donations to all causes taken together.) 
  Based on the above discussions, the general form of the models can be written 
as donations being a function of fundraising expenditure, price of giving, government 
grant receipts, other income receipts and the age of the charity. In summarising the 
existing results, we focus on the impacts of fundraising expenditure, price and 
government grants. 
  Posnett and Sandler use OLS on a cross section of 299 charities from Charity 
Trends 1986/87, the data typically referring to the 1985/86 accounting year. (At this 
time  Charity Trends covered the top 300 fundraising charities and we return in 
Section 3 to the issue of the charity excluded from the analysis, Band Aid Trust.) All 
variables except age were entered in logs. Overseas was the smallest of the sub-
samples, with 36 charities. The authors conclude that results are fairly similar for each 
of the four causes analysed ‘with the notable exception of charities operating 
overseas, where autonomous income [other income] is the only significant variable’ 
(1989: 196): fundraising, price and government grants are all insignificant in the 
model for overseas charities. For all three other causes, fundraising has a significant 
positive direct impact on donations and a significant negative impact via the price 
variable. For no cause is there evidence of significant crowding out by government 
grants (for overseas, the estimated parameter is -0.065, t = -1.6).   7
KPS and KS both use the CAF data to construct a balanced panel of 159 
charities for the eight years 1983-90. This has two advantages. First, there are 
substantially more data than in a single cross-section, although for fewer charities – 
the overseas sub-sample had 20 charities. Second, unobservable charity effects can be 
allowed for in estimation, picking up reputation or donor loyalty for example. KPS 
address the potential endogeneity of fundraising expenditure, autonomous income, 
government grants and price with the ‘quick fix’ (KS: 1547) of replacing current 
values with the one period lag of these regressors. Their preferred approach is within-
group estimation. Models are estimated in levels rather than with the log specification 
used by Posnett and Sandler. Nominal variables are deflated using the GDP deflator. 
Results for the whole sample (taking all charities together) are largely consistent with 
those obtained by Posnett and Sandler, at least with respect to the signs of the 
estimated effects. There is mild crowding in by government grants (i.e. a positive 
effect). Fundraising’s direct effect is again positive and the impact of price is again 
negative. And, once more, overseas charities differ from other types of charity with 
both price and government grants having an insignificant impact (t-statistics of -1.2 
and -0.4 respectively). However, the direct impact of fundraising is now significant 
for overseas charities (t = 3.0). Evaluating at the means (given the linear specification 
of the model), the total elasticity of donations with respect to fundraising (allowing 
for the impact also through the price variable) is estimated to be 0.23 for overseas 
charities. (This compares with 0.489 for social welfare, 0.221 for health, and 0.02 for 
religion.) 
KS take the modelling a step forward by using instrumental variable (IV) 
methods. The motivation is the possible endogeneity of government grants – the 
notion that grants may be correlated with positive shocks to donations. For this 
variable, the IV methods are intended to overcome the ‘quick fix’ in the earlier paper 
of using single-period lagged values, treated as exogenous. Use of IV allows 
donations to be modelled as a function of current period government grants (the 
authors argue that fundraising campaigns emphasise current levels of government 
support). The instruments for government grants include ‘macroeconomic’ variables 
that do not vary with the charity: total central government grants to charities and the 
central government deficit as a proportion of GDP. The other variables that had 
previously been entered as single-period lags are now also entered in current values, 
and treated as exogenous – fundraising, price, and other income.   8
Exogeneity of government grants is rejected by the data in models for all 
charities taken together. Allowing for endogeneity, the positive impact of grants, i.e. 
crowding in, becomes much larger (a finding reflected in the title of the paper).  
A varied picture is obtained when the model is estimated separately for each of 
the four causes. (As in the earlier papers, the switch from using the full sample to four 
sub-samples is accompanied by a reduction in the precision of estimates in line with 
the smaller sample sizes.) Government grants have no impact at all for overseas 
charities (t = -0.01), and the positive impacts for the other causes are significant (at 
the 5 percent level) only for social welfare charities. For overseas donations, this 
result is consistent with the findings of the earlier two papers. Again consistent with 
KPS (although not Posnett and Sandler), fundraising (now current rather than lagged 
as in KPS) has a positive impact for overseas giving (t = 3.4) and the total elasticity is 
very similar at sample mean values to that found earlier, 0.29.
5 Fundraising has a 
direct well-determined positive impact for the other three charity types too (with t-
statistics ranging from 4.6 to 12.6). The big change for overseas charities from both 
the earlier papers’ results is that the effect of price (now current, rather than lagged as 
in KPS) becomes significant (t = -2.7) and large – the elasticity at the mean values is 
estimated to be -2.0, twice the value for the full sample. The price variable is 
insignificant at the 5 percent level for the other three charity types. 
  Two obvious conclusions can be drawn from the results across the three 
papers. First, there seems evidence that the determinants of donations differ by cause. 
In particular, the results for overseas development charities are often different. 
Second, in some respects the three papers give similar results and in others they differ. 
In the case of overseas giving, government grants always have an insignificant 
impact. Fundraising expenditure has a positive impact in both papers using panel data 
(but not in the model estimated with a single year’s cross-section), whether 
endogenised through the ‘quick fix’ of entering the lagged value or whether treated as 
exogenous with the current value entered. The same switch between methods has a 
dramatic effect on the effect of the price variable (which is insignificant in the cross 
section model). 
                                                 
5   However, note that the elasticity in KPS is with respect to the one period lag, and not to the current 
value. The specification estimated in KPS may be thought of as a reduced form specification 
which can be arrived at from the specification in KS by substituting out the current values of the 
endogenous variables.  This would imply that the estimated effects in the model with lagged values 
replacing the current values would be picking up not just the structural effects.    9
 
Specifying a model for donations to development charities 
 
Our work builds on the Khanna-Posnett-Sandler papers. In doing so, we pay more 
attention to the supply side and, since we focus on overseas development charities, to 
the nature of giving to this particular cause. We model donations as a function of 
individuals’ incomes, this reflecting the supply side in particular. Our data cover a 
reasonably long period, 27 years. This means that we can consider the impact of the 
economic cycle, which would not have been possible with the 8 year panel used by 
KPS and KS. But as in KPS and KS we also allow for the actions of charities and 
government, which are emphasised in both supply and demand side explanations of 
giving. We specify donations to overseas development charity i to be a function of the 
following observable factors: Fundraising of charity i, Government grants to charity i, 
Total household income, Inequality in household income, Disasters, and ODA. We 
also allow for unobserved fixed characteristics of charity i, as explained later in 
Section 4. 
  Income is suggested by Atkinson’s identification model. Total household 
income rose by a factor of about 2½ over the period we consider, 1978-2004. The 
change from year to year was far from constant and there were periods of negative 
growth during the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. What was the impact 
on donations to development charities? We also allow for changes in the distribution 
of income. As is well known, the rise in household incomes in the UK was 
accompanied by a change in its distribution. Over the period as a whole, inequality of 
incomes rose substantially. Has this had a favourable impact on giving for 
development, on account of a higher marginal propensity to give of those on higher 
incomes? 
  A model of giving that focuses on development charities needs to recognise 
emergency relief as an important influence on donations. A major humanitarian crisis 
can have an immediate and large impact on the donor perceptions of need that are at 
the heart of the identification model. Our data span the period of the Ethiopian famine 
in 1984/5. It ends with the Asian Tsunami of Christmas 2004. And there were many 
smaller emergencies at other times. 
  ODA affects perceived need in the identification model. As noted earlier, this 
may lead to crowding out, or it may crowd in further giving if donors view a rise in   10
ODA as a signal of increased need. There is also the issue of how ODA should enter 
an empirical model of giving. We experiment with a variable measuring the ratio of 
ODA to GDP. Donors may have little knowledge of ODA levels. However, there may 
well be greater awareness of the UK government’s performance in relation to the UN 
target that ODA should be at least 0.7 per cent of national income. This figure is often 
referred to in commentary on the UK’s development assistance effort. We have noted 
already the sharp rise in ODA from the late 1990s.  
  We include government grants in the model, notwithstanding the results of the 
Khanna-Posnett-Sandler papers. We use a substantially larger data set, which offers 
the hope of more precise estimates. The very large growth in government grants to 
overseas development charities since the late 1970s, noted earlier, makes grant 
income an important factor to consider. We do not hypothesise the sign of any impact, 
since as noted earlier there are arguments for both crowding out and for crowding in. 
There are also arguments for no impact: Horne et al (2005) find donors responding to 
a US survey to have little knowledge of the government grants received by the 
charities to which they give.
6 
  Unlike government grants, fundraising was found in both the earlier studies 
using a panel of CAF data to have a positive impact on overseas donations. We have 
argued that fundraising may affect perceived need in developing countries and 
explanations of charitable giving from either the supply or the demand side provide a 
role for this influence. 
  A second effect of fundraising is allowed through a ‘price’ variable, which we 
calculated as in the Khanna-Posnett-Sandler papers as 1/(1 − f − a) where f and a are 
the proportions of total expenditure spent by the charity on fundraising and 
administration. We have noted the marked change for overseas charities in the 
estimated impact of this variable between KPS and KS. Viewed as a measure of 
leakage of donations to overseas charities this is a far from ideal variable. It captures 
none of the loss of funds through corruption and misgovernment in developing 
countries that is the typical concern of giving to this cause (unless one can argue that 
this is reflected in higher administration costs resulting from charities’ attempts to 
deal with the problem). However, we include it so as to aid comparability with the 
                                                 
6   Andreoni and Payne (2008) argue that crowding out by grants may occur on the demand side, by 
reducing fundraising, as well as on the supply side. They find this to be important in their 
empirical work.   11
earlier literature. Like Khanna-Posnett-Sandler, we do not include a marginal tax rate 
in the variable’s construction (given the restrictions on tax deductions prior to 2000). 
We considered but rejected the use of variables for the charity’s age, and its other 
income. Given that we allow in our econometric model for unobserved fixed charity 
factors, which can be thought of as including date of foundation, charity age would 
merely measure a time trend. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
We assemble as long a run as possible of information from the CAF reports on the 
donations made to top fundraising charities. The reports began in 1978 and the last 
report for which information was collected on a consistent basis was published in 
2006. There was no report in 1995, and we did not have access to the report for 1981. 
The reports document the donations, bequests, other incomes – for example 
government grants – and selected expenditures of the leading fundraising charities in 
the UK. (The figures for donations for each charity are obtained by subtracting the 
figure for legacies from the total given for ‘voluntary income’.) The report at first 
analysed the top 200 fundraising charities in each year. Coverage increased to the top 
300 in 1985, to the top 400 in 1986, and to the top 500 since 1991. (These dates refer 
to the year of publication.) Donations come largely from individuals, but also include 
those from the corporate sector and from grant-making charitable trusts. These cannot 
be separated in the data, but recent estimates for the top 300 charities serving all 
causes (not just development) indicate that corporate donations represent only about 1 
per cent of total voluntary income (including legacies) and trusts about 8 per cent 
(Pharoah 2008: 63). 
  We assembled the data from spreadsheet files into a consistent format. (Full 
details of the assembly and cleaning of the data are given in Atkinson et al 2008.) 
Charity names often varied from year to year for one or more reasons (including 
simple changes in the abbreviated form of a name). Having homogenized the names, 
the next step was to assign the data for any charity from a given report to an 
appropriate year on a consistent basis – the financial years to which data referred in a 
given year’s report could vary substantially.
7 We define as ‘development’ charities 
                                                 
7   We applied the rule that where the charity’s reporting year finishes before July 1st the observation 
is assigned to the previous year.   12
both the charities grouped under this heading in the CAF reports and the ‘religious 
international’ charities that are separately identified by CAF. The latter include such 
major development charities as Christian Aid and CAFOD.
8 The dataset contains a 
total of 70 overseas development charities that appear in Charity Trends at least once 
during the period we analyse, of which we drop two (see below) leaving us with 68. 
The names of these charities are listed in the Appendix, together with in each case the 
year of entry to the dataset, the number of annual observations for the charity, the 
number of these observations that have been ‘filled-in’ by us (see below), and the 
lengths of the charity’s longest run of consecutive years, without and then with these 
filled-in values. The charities all have a principal focus on overseas development and 
relief, but include a number that serve domestic as well as overseas causes (e.g. the 
Red Cross and Save the Children). The median year of entry is 1989 and the median 
number of observations and median longest run (without filling-in) are 12 years and 6 
years. The dataset also contains 742 non-development charities present in at least one 
year. 
Filled-in data are data we have imputed where there are missing values (we 
impute the average of the values for the preceding and following years). Data may be 
missing for various reasons. The lack of the 1981 report is one cause.
9 We also impute 
if the same data were included by CAF in Charity Trends for two years running (as 
happens on occasion) or if data are missing for a single year for another reason. (See 
Atkinson et al 2008 for details.) However, we do not impute if data are missing 
because a charity has dropped out of the CAF rankings nor do we impute data for 
years before a charity enters the rankings. 
Figure 1 shows the total donations going to development charities in real terms 
over 1978-2004, taking charities that were among the top 200 fundraisers in any year. 
(Years are defined on financial years, and not the CAF report years.) A series for total 
after-tax household income is also included, and this is the variable for household 
income that we include in the subsequent analysis. Both series are deflated by the 
Retail Price Index, as are all nominal variables that we use. We also include in the 
model a measure of inequality of income – we choose a measure that focuses on the 
                                                 
8   We exclude the Priory of St John, commonly known as St John Ambulance, which is included by 
CAF in the first group. 
9   There is not always an interruption in the data for 1981 since the financial year covered by the 
CAF reports for any individual charity vary.   13
top half of the distribution, the ratio of the 90
th to the 50
th percentile of equivalised 
household income.
10 
Growth in overseas donations was far from steady over the period. The spike 
in 1984 and 1985 is on account of the response to the Ethiopian famine. This was in 
part stimulated by Bob Geldof, who organised the Band Aid Christmas single in 1984 
and the Live Aid concerts in 1985. Geldof’s Band Aid Trust was the charity with the 
most donations in the UK in 1985 (among all causes and not just overseas 
development), with £122m (in 2007 prices). We decided to exclude this charity from 
our econometric analysis since it was not founded in order to continue raising funds. 
Its removal still leaves a spike in the two years. For example, Oxfam had a record 
year in 1984, with its £109m of donations (in 2007 prices) nearly double the level of 
the year before. We also exclude Comic Relief from the analysis (but, like Band Aid, 
is included in Figure 1). This charity raises funds with a telethon and associated 
events every two years, so it does not raise funds each year like other charities. 
  Table 1 gives summary statistics on the variables we use in the model. Panels 
A and B report on the charity level variables for development and non-development 
charities respectively. The unit of analysis is the charity-year. Panel C reports on 
variables that vary with years, t, but not charities, i. The unit of analysis here is the 
year. The mean annual donations received by a development charity is £11m (2004 
prices), nearly three times as large as for a non-development charity: development 
charities are larger than average (see Atkinson et al 2008 for more discussion). 
Donations vary greatly for both types of charity as shown by the large standard 
deviations. Statistics for fundraising and grants refer to positive values only. 
Information on fundraising is missing or is recorded as zero in 10 percent of cases for 
development charities and 15 percent of cases for non-development charities. The 
percentages of zeros or missing data are substantially higher for government grants – 
34 percent and 58 percent respectively. In the case of fundraising, the absence of 
positive values is not easy to understand – these are all charities that are among the 
top 500 in terms of donated income and it does not seem likely that this status can be 
attained without spending money on raising funds. It seems more likely that 
fundraising expenditure has been absorbed into administration costs. Average 
fundraising costs for development charities are about 20 percent of donations and 
                                                 
10     The variable is taken from http://www.ifs.org.uk/fiscalFacts and refers to equivalised after-tax 
(before housing costs) household income.   14
about 25 percent for non-development charities. Note that charities have other forms 
of income including legacies and investment income so the message is not one that 
charities are spending on average a fifth to a quarter of their donations on fundraising. 
In the case of government grants, zeros or missing values are easy to understand – 
many charities do not get government grants.
11 For both development and non-
development charities, the mean values of the grants are large relative to donations. 
Problems in estimation may arise if variables are trended. In broad terms, the 
ODA/GDP ratio trends downward for much of the period and total government grants 
trend upward. But the movements in the series are not monotonic. Grants to 
development charities exhibit a strong upward trend until 1994 before falling back 
somewhat and then rising uncertainly for the rest of the period. Figure 2 shows 
movements in ODA as a percentage of GDP, in log household income (as we explain 
below, we enter income in logs in the model) and the 90/50 ratio. As a percentage of 
ODA, falls until about 1998 as a result of the level of ODA stagnating in real terms. 
The trend is then reversed with ODA moving sharply upwards from 2009, reflecting 
the Labour government’s commitment to meeting the UN target of 0.7 per cent 
national income. The 90/50 ratio rises until the early 1990s and then flattens out. 
Accompanying these medium to long-term trends, there is a significant variation in 
year to year changes.  
 
4. Econometric Specification 
 
Based on the discussions in Section 2, we consider the following log-linear 
specification for log donations y:
12  
 
 
''
it it t it y xz u βγ =+ +         ( 1 )  
and   it i it u α ε =+         ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
11   For the development charities, the time series of total government grants recorded in the CAF data 
matches quite well a series from a different source on grants made by the Department for 
International Development (Atkinson et al 2008, Figure 12). 
12   We find the log-linear model to be more appropriate given the highly skewed distribution of the 
un-logged donations. A dynamic specification of the above model was not supported by the data.  
That is, all observed persistence of the donations seemed to be adequately captured by unobserved 
charity specific variable.   15
i and t index charities and years respectively, i α is a charity-specific effect (which may 
be correlated with observable variables), and  it ε  is the error term. Fundraising 
expenditure, the ‘price’ variable, and the amount of government grant received by the 
charity enter  x in log form. Without omitting a significant proportion of non-positive 
values of these variables, we include dummy variables to pick up these observations. 
(We have noted the prevalence of zeroes above.)  The effect of these variables on 
donations is estimated therefore from the differences in the positive values only. The 
macro variables such as the ODA grants as a percentage of GDP, log household 
income, a measure of income inequality defined as the 90-50 ratio, and dummy 
variables to pick up the effect of the Ethiopian crises that occurred in 1984 and 1985 
are included in z.  Results from a model with time dummies instead of z are also 
presented for comparison. 
There are several econometric issues that need to be addressed in the 
estimation of equations (1) and (2).  The first issue concerns the endogenous nature of 
both the fundraising expenditure (and as a consequence the ‘price’ variable) and the 
amount of government grant received by the charity, due to possible correlation 
between these variables and the error term u. A positive shock to donations means that 
a charity can afford to spend more on fundraising. Such a shock could have positive 
or negative effects on the government grants it receives, depending on how these 
grants are allocated. Under the assumption that the correlation may be entirely 
captured by the unobserved heterogeneity  i α , within-group (WG) estimators of β and 
γ would be consistent and we present some WG results in what follows. On the other 
hand, if in addition, there is also correlation between the regressors and  it ε (as 
suggested by our discussion of the effects of shocks), the most appropriate technique 
would be instrumental variable (IV) estimation that also accounts for  i α . To allow for 
correlation between the regressors and the unobserved heterogeneity  i α , we first-
difference (FD) the equation to eliminate the  i α  and then apply the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM-diff) technique using different lags of the variables.
13  
                                                 
13   WG transformation also can be used to eliminate the unobservable α prior to the application of IV 
estimation using lags of the regressors as instruments.  In the simple case with one endogenous 
regressor and no external instruments, this is equivalent to using WG estimation in the regression 
of the endogenous variable on the lagged endogenous regressors in the first stage.  The predicted 
values from this regression are used as instruments in the second stage regression.  As T →∞ the 
bias in the first stage WG regression estimator will go to zero. We have chosen to use first   16
The precise set of moment conditions that are used to generate the set of instruments 
depends on the assumptions about the above correlations. We shall return to the 
choice of lags we use as instruments when we discuss the results in the next section.  
The second issue we have to address concerns the method of construction of 
our dataset and the possibility that this leads to an endogenously generated sample.  
As discussed in Section 3 earlier, whether a particular charity appears in the dataset 
for a particular year depends on whether the charity was ranked among the top R in 
terms of the amount of donations received by this charity in that year.  The data 
collection procedure saw the value of R increased from 200 in 1978 to 500 in 1991.  If 
the above selection can be captured using charity specific variable  i α , then the WG 
estimator or the FD estimator would be consistent. However, as we saw earlier, 
endogeneity due to correlation between the regressors and εit will also need to be 
addressed. In the absence of suitable instruments to deal with endogenous selection 
that might not be adequately captured by the lags of the regressors, we check for 
sensitivity of the results to different choices made with regard to the sample selected 
for the estimation.  
One practical problem with the GMM approach is that the number of 
instruments can be numerous. Unlike in two-stage-least-squares (2SLS), where the 
estimation sample is restricted according to the choice of lags for the instrument, in 
standard applications of GMM a separate instrument is included for each time period.  
To illustrate this problem, consider the following example with one endogenous 
regressor xit. 
 
  it it i it y xu βα =+ +      t=1,..,5      (3) 
 
If we were to apply 2SLS to estimate (3) in first-differences, xit-2 and higher order lags 
of  x  can be used as an instrument for Δxit under the assumption that 
[] 0 it s it Ex u − Δ= for 2. s ≥   This would imply that the estimation sample would be 
t=3,..,5 and every additional lag of a variable to the set of instruments would result in 
the loss of one extra time observation.  In contrast, the standard GMM-diff approach 
                                                                                                                                            
differencing to eliminate the α and estimate the equation using GMM in order to be able to use 
more lags of the regressors as instruments without drastically reducing the available estimation 
sample, as discussed later in this section.   17
includes separate instruments for each time period resulting in a sparse instrument set 
but larger estimation sample. In the case of GMM-diff, the instrument matrix for 
charity i would be: 
 
 
1
12
123
0 0 0 0 0 0...
0 0 0 0 0...
0 0 0 0...
.......
.......
i
ii
i iii
x
xx
Z xxx
⎡⎤
⎢⎥
⎢⎥
= ⎢⎥
⎢⎥
⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
.  
For example, the instruments for the regressor’s observation  32 () ii x x − would be 1 i x . 
Three practical problems can result with the use of a sparse instrument set (Roodman 
2007).  First, the instruments can be too weak to identify the relevant effects. Second, 
the precision of the weighting matrix that is used in the GMM estimation is affected. 
Third, some of the statistical tests that are used for model validation can have low 
power. Given these problems, we investigated the approach of a strand of the 
literature where the standard GMM-diff instruments are combined through addition to 
create a smaller instrument set (Roodman 2006, 2007).  Taking the example discussed 
above, the new instrument matrix would be  
1
21
321
00 .
0.
.
... .
i
ii
i
iii
x
xx
Z
xxx
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ =
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
.  
This is achieved in STATA using the ‘collapse’ option in estimation command 
xtabond2. Based on the tests for over-identification and the tests for first and second 
order serial correlations, the preferred specification uses lags 4 to 9 of all the 
endogenous regressors (xit) as instruments.  All the macro variables are treated as 
strictly exogenous in all specifications. 
We have used three tests to investigate the validity of our chosen instruments. 
The first is the Sargan/Hansen test for over-identification (Sargan 1958, Hansen 1982) 
which requires non-rejection of the null hypothesis being tested.  The second and third 
are serial correlation tests (Arellano and Bond 1991) that tests for the presence of 
serial correlation in the first differenced errors εit. White noise errors εit would imply a 
MA(1) process for the Δ εit, thus rejecting the null of no first order serial correlation 
but not rejecting the null of second order serial correlation. We use xtabond2   18
(Roodman 2006) in StataCorp (2005) to estimate our models using the GMM 
technique.  
  Finally, because of the number of lags that are used as instruments, when 
applying GMM the model is estimated using information on charities that appeared 
continuously in the sample for at least 7 consecutive years. We check for sensitivity of 
the choice of this sample. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The results of various model specifications and estimations are presented in Table 2. 
(We do not report estimated coefficients of dummy variables for missing or zero 
fundraising, price or grant variables.) Columns [1] to [8] report models estimated for 
development charities only. Unless otherwise stated models are estimated for samples 
that exclude filled-in values. Column [1] presents the results from a pooled OLS 
regression. There is no allowance made for unobserved charity specific effects, 
although the estimation of the standard errors allows for clustering of observations at 
the charity level. Columns [2] to [4] present results from the Within Group (WG) 
estimation (i.e. OLS on variables entered in deviations from time-means). In the 
absence of any endogenous regressors, WG estimator will provide consistent 
estimators. All available observations are used in the estimations presented in column 
[1] and [2]. If the regressors are correlated with the charity specific unobservable 
i α but not with the idiosyncratic error term  it ε , then WG estimators will be 
consistent. Most coefficient estimates change very substantially between columns [1] 
and [2], underlining the importance of allowing for these unobservable factors. We 
delay discussion of the size and significance of the estimates until describing other 
columns in the table. 
  As discussed earlier, due to the way the information was collected and 
recorded by CAF, the available data constitutes an unbalanced panel. Availability of 
information for a particular charity in a particular year was dependent on whether the 
charity existed in that year and also whether the amount of donations it received came 
in the top few hundreds to be eligible for inclusion in the CAF reports. In order to 
check for possible endogenous sample selection, we have estimated the same model 
using different sub-samples of data.  The results from this exercise are presented in   19
columns [3] and [4].  Both specifications use WG estimation. We use all observations 
on those charities that entered the sample before 1985 and before 1991 respectively, 
years when the coverage was increased to the top 300 and then 500. 
Column [5] presents results from estimating the model by GMM, allowing for 
fundraising, price, and government grants to be correlated with both the charity 
specific unobservable  i α  as well as the idiosyncratic error  it ε . (As noted earlier, the 
model is estimated with 4-9 lags of the endogenous regressors as instruments.)
14 We 
select the longest continuous run of observations for each charity, imposing the 
condition that this must be at least 7 years.  For example, if a charity was present for 2 
consecutive years at the beginning, leaves the sample (whether through dropping out 
of the CAF rankings or because of missing data) and then re-enters and is present for 
7 years continuously after this absence, we then keep only the last 7 years of 
observations for our estimation (a number chosen to ensure that we could use the 
appropriate lags for instruments). This leads to the model being estimated on 
somewhat less than half the charities and half the charity-years. We present in column 
[6] the results from WG estimation, using the same sample as used in column [5]. In 
column [7] we give results from estimating the model for for all charities for all years 
again, but now including the filled-in values. In these two columns we are back to 
allowing for correlation of the regressors with the  i α only. 
The comparison of columns [2] to [4] helps gauge whether there might be a 
problem with sample selection that cannot be accommodated by allowing for 
unobserved fixed charity effects. The estimated coefficients are fairly stable for those 
that are statistically significant, although the impact of price in column [2] differs 
somewhat from that in the other two columns. The lack of much change is 
encouraging. The GMM model in column [5] passes the three specification tests (the 
number of lags used as instruments was chosen to ensure this). The results obtained 
using WG estimation in column [6] are reasonably similar to those obtained with 
GMM and the same sample in column [5]. Column [8] shows results obtained with 
the same sample as column [2] in which the macroeconomic variables are replaced 
with time dummies. The estimated coefficients for the charity variables are almost 
unchanged.  
                                                 
14   9 lags are used if the charity’s longest run of data is 9 years or more, 8 lags if it is 8 years long and 
7 lags if it is 7 years.   20
What do the results tell us about the determinants of donations to overseas 
charities? First we consider charity variables, which were the focus of the Khanna-
Posnett-Sandler papers. The ceteris paribus direct impact of fundraising is reasonably 
well determined, with an elasticity of 0.2 when we use the GMM approach and 0.27-
0.37 in the models estimated by WG. This is broadly similar to the level found by 
KPS and KS (evaluating at the mean in their case given the linear functional form 
used). At mean values of donations and fundraising, an elasticity of 0.2 implies that 
an increase in fundraising of £100k would bring forth additional donations of over 
£200k. However, this calculation ignores the indirect impact of fundraising coming 
through the price variable, which is negative and well determined (as in KS but not 
KPS). Given the definition of this price variable, the total elasticity of donations with 
respect to fundraising, including both direct and indirect impacts is given by the 
following expression (where net total expenditure is defined as total expenditure less 
fundraising and administration): 
 
      fundraising coeff. + price coeff. × (ratio of fundraising to net total expenditure). 
 
The negative impact of price has a large dampening effect. But the estimated total 
elasticity is still positive in all columns [1] to [7] given the mean sample value of the 
ratio of fundraising to net expenditure (0.057) and typically positive at the top quartile 
(0.076). Government grants are estimated to have a positive effect, indicating 
crowding in. But the effect is small – the elasticity varies between 0.05 and 0.09 – and 
is not well determined. The coefficient just fails to be significant at the 5 percent level 
in the results obtained with GMM in column [5]. 
  We now turn to the other variables in the model, not included in the KS and 
KPS analyses. Ceteris paribus, donations are estimated with the GMM approach to be 
a third higher in 1984, a result of the response to the Ethiopian famine. Note that this 
is the year before the large spike shown in Figure 1. But that spike is largely 
associated with The Band Aid Trust, which we have excluded from the sample used 
here. In fact an additional dummy for 1985 proved insignificant. The coefficients on 
log household income range from 0.81 in column [5] to 1.12 in column [6]. The 
impact of income is reasonably well determined (and in contrast to the charity 
variables there is only temporal variation to be exploited) but we can never reject the 
hypothesis of a unitary elasticity. The effect of the 90/50 ratio proves rather unstable.   21
It is not significant at conventional levels in either set of results obtained with runs of 
data of 7 years or more (columns [5] and [6]) but is significant at the 10 percent level 
in columns [2] and [4] and (just) at the 5 percent level in column [3] in the model 
estimated for charities existing prior to 1985. The coefficient of about 1.0 implies that 
a one standard deviation rise in the 90/50 ratio reduces donations by 12 percent. 
Finally, the variable for ODA as a percentage of GDP is not significant in any model. 
We can find evidence neither of crowding out nor of crowding in from this measure of 
the level of government spending on development assistance relative to national 
income. 
  In column [9] we estimate the same model for non-development charities 
using GMM. The specification tests reported at the foot of the table are again passed. 
(The sample is restricted to the longest continuous run of observations for each charity 
of at least 10 years.) On the one hand this is a much larger sample of data than for the 
development charities, which should improve the precision of the estimates. On the 
other, it is a much more heterogenous sample being composed of charities serving a 
wide range of causes, which will reduce precision if the determinants of donations 
vary from cause to cause. In practice, the latter effect tends to dominate for the charity 
level variables and the former for the macro variables (judging by the size of the 
estimated standard errors compared to those in column [5]). The direct effect of 
fundraising and of price are both less than for the development charities while we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the (positive) government grants elasticity is the 
same. Surprisingly there is small positive impact from the 1984 dummy, albeit 
significant only at the 10 percent level: the obvious hypothesis was for a negative 
effect of the Ethiopian famine on giving to other causes. The log income coefficient is 
well determined. It is very similar to that in column [5] for development charities but 
because it is better determined we can just reject the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity 
at the 5 percent level, implying that giving to non-development causes (taken 
together) is a necessity. The 90/50 ratio is once more insignificant, as is ODA as a 
percent of GDP (where we would not have expected otherwise). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have modelled the determinants of donations received by overseas 
development charities in the UK, using panel data that span over 25 years. In doing so   22
we have built on a small existing literature using the same source of data, but one that 
has not focused in particular on development (or any other cause) and which used 
substantially less data. In thinking about how to model giving for development, we 
have been able to draw on new theoretical insights in Atkinson (2008). 
  Our results may be summarised as follows: 
•  Fundraising has a powerful effect on donations received by development charities 
but the effect appears not to be monotonic. Forcing an indirect impact from 
fundraising through the price variable used by earlier authors, we find that the 
overall impact eventually turns negative. However, this price variable does not 
capture many of the leakages with which donors to overseas development are 
concerned, which have nothing to do with excessive fundraising. 
•  We find no evidence of crowding out of giving by government grants. Grants 
appear to have a modest although not very well determined positive impact. This 
supports the existing results in the UK literature. 
•  We can’t reject the hypothesis that giving to overseas development has a unitary 
income elasticity. This is in line with results from survey microdata on individuals 
and their giving (Micklewright and Schnepf 2009). The estimated elasticity is 
similar for donations to non-development causes. A unitary elasticity implies that 
the current recession will not have the devastating impact on charitable donations 
that has been predicted in some of the mass media. We find no robust significant 
impact from changes in the inquality of household incomes, holding constant total 
income. 
•  We find no evidence that ODA has crowded out donations for development.   23
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Figure 1 
UK charitable donations for overseas development and total household income: 
1978-2004 (constant 2007 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the donations refer to all overseas charities (defined as 
in the text) among the top 200 fundraising charities in each 
year. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Trends in macroeconomic variables, 1978-2004 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
 
A: Charity Level Variables for Development Charities    
  
Non-Zero 
Observations  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Donations (£000s)  800  11,176  17,677 
Fundraising  (£000s)  718  2,332  4,084 
Government Grants  (£000s)  503  8,099  12,967 
          
B: Charity Level Variables for Non-Development Charities    
  
Non-Zero 
Observations  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Donations (£000s)  8,032  4,039  9,486 
Fundraising (£000s)  6,873  1,049  2,957 
Government Grants (£000s)  3,343  3,824  10,063 
           
C: Macroeconomic Variables       
   Years  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Household Income (£m)  27  461,260 106,211 
90/50 Ratio  27  1.96  0.12 
ODA as % of GDP  27  0.32  0.06 
 
Note: The unit of analysis in Panels A and B is the charity-year and in Panel C is the 
year. Panels A and B refer to data for 68 overseas charities and 742 non-development 
charities present in the data at any time. Statistics for fundraising and grants in Panels 
A and B refer to positive values only. Monetary variables are in 2007 prices.   27
Table 2:   Model Estimates (std error) 
 
   
Development Charities 
Non-
Development 
Charities 
Estimation OLS  WG  WG  WG  GMM  WG  WG  WG  GMM 
Dependent 
Variable is 
Log 
Donaions 
All 
Charities 
All Years 
 
[1] 
All Charities 
All Years 
 
 
[2] 
Pre-1985 
Charities All 
Years 
 
[3] 
Pre-1991 
Charities All 
Years 
 
[4] 
All Charities 
Runs of 7 
Years or 
More 
[5] 
All Charities 
Runs of 7 
Years or 
More 
[6] 
All Charities 
with 
Imputed 
Values 
[7] 
All Charities 
with Time 
Dummies 
 
[8] 
All Charities 
Runs of 10 
Years or 
More 
[9] 
Log 
Fundraising 
0.625*** 0.316*** 0.364*** 0.304***  0.201*** 0.270*** 0.321*** 0.295*** 0.148*** 
    (0.056) (0.051) (0.061) (0.053) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.047) 
Log  Grants  0.015  0.059** 0.068** 0.086***  0.051*  0.062** 0.057** 0.057** 0.081** 
    (0.053) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) 
Log  Price  -6.808*** -3.874*** -5.621*** -3.657*** -3.293*** -3.369*** -4.048*** -3.845*** -2.492** 
    (1.045) (1.147) (1.340) (1.304) (0.781) (0.821) (1.031) (1.207) (1.069) 
Ethiopia  0.359***  0.282** 0.236** 0.270** 0.333***  0.439***  0.323***      0.043* 
  (1984)  (0.129) (0.114) (0.111) (0.114) (0.042) (0.111) (0.104)      (0.022) 
Log  Income  -0.238  0.922*** 0.902*** 0.944*** 0.806*** 1.118*** 0.899***      0.775*** 
    (0.286) (0.251) (0.293) (0.253) (0.241) (0.240) (0.230)      (0.107) 
90/50 Ratio  -0.561  -0.857*  -1.301**  -0.972* -0.272  -0.938  -0.715      0.061 
    (0.743) (0.489) (0.505) (0.512) (0.168) (0.652) (0.458)      (0.135) 
ODA/GDP  -0.459 -0.273 -0.714 -0.211 0.729  -0.329  -0.402     -0.041 
    (0.734) (0.619) (0.733) (0.659) (0.630) (0.723) (0.556)      (0.184) 
Constant  9.376***  -3.942 -2.644 -4.089      -5.991**  -3.882  6.208***     
    (2.595) (2.569) (2.954) (2.576)      (2.474) (2.387) (0.297)     
# of 
observations 
813 813 490 692 366 366 900 813 2889 
#  of  charities  68 68 26 46 32 32 68 68 242 
AR(1) p-value          0.0149        3.49e-06 
AR(2)  p-value         0.0965      0.181 
Hansen Test  
p-Value [df] 
       0.928 
[29 ] 
    0.128 
[ 24] 
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Notes: the model also includes: dummies equal to 1 for missing/zero values for price, fundraising and governments grants. Ethiopia (1984) is a 
dummy equal to 1 in that year. ODA/GDP is ODA as a percentage of GDP. All standard errors allow for clustering of the data at the charity 
level. Column [3] {[4}] uses data on charities that appeared before 1985 {1991}; Column [5] uses only charities with runs of seven or more 
years and lags from 4 to 9 as instruments. Column [6] uses the same sample as in column [5].  Filled-in values for missing data are included in 
column [7] (see text for further details). Column [9] uses runs of 10 years or more and lags from 3 to 10 as instruments.  ***, **, * coefficient 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Appendix Table -  Development charities in the CAF data 
 
Name 
 
Year 
of 
entry 
 
Number 
of 
years 
Filled-in 
values 
Longest 
run 
without 
filling-in 
Longest 
run with 
filling-in 
Christian Aid  1978  27  3  19  27 
Save the Children Fund  1978  27  3  17  27 
Tearfund  1978  27  3  13  27 
Voluntary Service Overseas  1978  27  2  14  27 
British Leprosy Relief Association 
(Lepra)  1982  26  2  15  23 
British Red Cross Society  1986  26  2  13  19 
Catholic Agency For Overseas 
Development  1979  26  3  14  26 
Oxfam  1978  26  2  14  17 
Sightsavers  1985  26  5  13  20 
Actionaid  1979  25  2  14  21 
UNICEF  1981  24  1  24  24 
Leprosy Mission (International)  1986  23  3  13  16 
Quaker Peace and Service  1981  23  6  10  23 
Intermediate Technology Development 
Group  1984  21  1  18  21 
Wateraid  1985  20  1  10  20 
World Vision UK  1984  20  1  13  13 
Plan International (UK)  1984  19  6  4  12 
Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund  1986  19  1  11  19 
Care International UK  1989  18  1  13  16 
International Christian Relief  1984  18  1  11  18 
Marie Stopes International  1987  18  2  12  18 
Methodist Relief And Development 
Fund  1983  18  1  12  16 
St Josephs Hospice Association  1986  16  1  11  16 
War On Want  1978  16  3  7  11 
Christian Children’s Fund of Great 
Britain  1985  15  1  13  15 
Co-workers of Mother Teresa  1981  14  1  9  13 
Medical Foundation for the Care of 
Victims  1991  14  2  8  14 
Operation Raleigh  1996  14  0  13  4 
SOS Children’s Villages UK  1992  14  1  8  10 
Amnesty International UK Section 
Charitable Trust  1992  13  1  11  13 
Everychild  1996  13  0  9  9 
Federation of Jewish Relief 
Organisations  1991  13  1  3  7 
Book Aid International  1993  12  1  6  12 
Catholic Institute for International 
Relations  1989  12  1  6  11 
Karuna Trust  1992  12  1  7  10   30
Appendix Table -  Continued 
 
 
Name 
Year 
of 
entry 
Number 
of 
years 
Filled-in 
values 
Longest 
run 
without 
filling-in 
Longest 
run with 
filling-in 
Survive Miva  1989  11  1  9  9 
Medical Aid For Poland Fund  1986  9  2  2  6 
Oasis Charitable Trust  1995  9  1  6  7 
Ockenden Venture  2002  9  2  4  2 
St Francis Leprosy Guild  1991  9  1  5  5 
Acord  1992  7  1  5  6 
Impact Foundation  1997  7  2  4  5 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (UK)  2000  7  0  6  5 
Rokpa Trust  1994  7  0  5  7 
Sudan United Mission  1978  7  1  3  7 
Childrens Aid Direct  1995  6  1  5  6 
Medical Aid for Palestinians  1989  6  1  5  4 
Mines Advisory Group  1993  6  1  4  3 
Project Hope United Kingdom  1996  6  0  6  6 
SOS Sahel International  1991  6  1  2  4 
World Evangelism Society of Great 
Britain  1985  6  1  3  5 
Befrienders International  1995  5  1  3  5 
Medical Emergency Relief International 
Charitable Trust  1997  5  1  2  5 
Africa Now  1987  4  1  2  4 
Britain-Nepal Medical Trust  1991  4  0  4  2 
Farm Africa  1994  4  0  3  3 
International Boys Town Trust  1986  4  0  4  4 
Opportunity Trust  1994  4  0  3  3 
Feed the Children (Europe)  1992  3  0  3  3 
Ireland Fund of Great Britain  1995  3  1  1  2 
Children of the Andes  1994  2  0  2  1 
Christian Solidarity International  2000  2  1  1  2 
Global Care  1999  2  0  1  2 
International Voluntary Service  1988  2  0  2  1 
Muslim Hands  2002  2  0  2  1 
Sisters of The Cross and Passion  2004  2  0  1  1 
African Medical and Research 
Foundation Limited  1994  1  0  1  1 
Sim International (UK)  1987  1  0  1  1 
 
Notes:    year of entry is the first financial year for which there is data (not CAF report years). Filled-in values are 
  described in the text. 